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Great Britain and her colonies began their disagreements leading up to the American 
Revolution over the idea of taxation and representation in Parliament. A new form of taxation 
came with the passage of Sugar Act in March, 1764. This form aimed at raising revenue to pay 
for part ofthe cost of Britain's colonial expenses in North America. All previous taxation on the 
colonies had only been used to regulate commerce. The British judged the colonists should be 
taxed to help pay for the cost of the French war that had been fought in their defense and 
protection. 1 The previous method of voluntary taxation was unpredictable, unequal, and could 
take months to gather. Because it was voluntary, states like Pennsylvania and Massachusetts 
tended to give much more than states like Maryland and New Jersey.2 Colonies avoided paying 
this new tax by smuggling in sugar from other countries. 
In response to smuggling, Parliament passed the Stamp Act in 1765 because it was easy 
to implement, hard to avoid, and distributed relatively equally between the colonies.3 All 
paperwork, playing cards, and letters had to receive a stamp from Parliament which was bought 
from an officer of England. Parliament admitted the colonies would not react well to the new 
direct, internal tax. In fact, the colonies simply refused to use the new stamps.4 Also, the 
colonists created a group called the "Stamp Act Congress" in the fall of 1765 to write King 
George III and Parliament. They declared their loyalty to Britain, but protested being taxed 
without being represented in Parliament.5 Parliament refuted their argument by claiming 
colonists were virtually represented like all other Englishmen who could not vote through virtual 
1 Sydney George Fisher, The True History of the American Revolution (Philadelphia: JB Lippincott Company, 
1902), 51 
2 Ibid., 53 
3 Bruce Lancaster, The American Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971 ), 30-31 
4 Fisher, 55 
5 Ibid, 58-59 
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representation. Parliament claimed they created laws with the interest of all Englishmen even if 
they are not directly representing them.6 
The Townshend Act of 1867 taxed tea and other goods. England realized the colonists 
were smuggling tea from Holland to avoid the shilling per pound tax. Parliament dropped the tax 
to three pence per pound to encourage buying English tea. Colonists nonetheless smuggled in the 
Dutch tea on principle against taxation by Britain.7 After the Tea Act, patriots in the colonies 
refused to allow English tea to enter their harbors.8 In New York, Philadelphia, and New 
Hampshire tea refused to accept the tea and forced it to return to England. Charleston, South 
Carolina allowed the tea to enter the town, but colonists refused to buy any of it. The tea then 
rotted in damp cellars.9 Boston experienced the fieriest resistance to the Tea Tax. Samuel 
Adams, a strong rebel from Boston, began the first cries for independence from Britain. He 
called for a "Congress of American states to frame a bill of rights," or to "form an independent 
state, and American cornmonwealth."10 On December 16, 1773, Adams, along with John 
Hancock and other patriots dressed up like Mohawk Indians and destroyed all the tea on board 
ships in Boston Harbor. Three shiploads oftea, worth £15,000, were dumped into the sea. No 
one attempted to stop the mob from destroying the tea. The admiral of the fleet is said to have 
said, "Enjoy your sport but prepare to pay the piper." 11 The "piper," or Parliament, required not 
only repayment for the destroyed tea, but closed Boston's harbor until the Governor Thomas 
Hutchinson assured Parliament the repayment had been made.12 
6 Ibid., 67 
7 Ibid., I 02-103 
8 Ibid., 107 
9 Ibid., 109 
10 Ibid., I 07 
11 Ibid ., 112 
12 Ibid., 116-117 
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In April, 1775, after the Boston Tea Party, General Thomas Gage, commander of British 
forces in America, sent eight hundred troops to Lexington, Massachusetts to arrest Samuel 
Adams and John Hancock. Gage believed his troops had left Boston in secrecy, but their 
movements had been watched by patriot Paul Revere who rode through the night to warn Adams 
and Hancock and gather reinforcements to meet the British troops. Rebels in Lexington raided 
the military stores and waited behind stone walls for the small British force. 13 The rebels 
outnumbered the British. They retreated to Concord, but rebels had already gathered there, and 
the British were forced to retreat back to Boston. The British suffered heavy causalities, almost 
half of their total forces and all of their officers. 14 This was the first battle of what would become 
the American Revolution. 
Tales of great patriotism, against both the tyrannical King George III and his allegedly 
evil Parliament, fill American text books. As the old saying goes, "there are always two sides to 
the story." American history books almost always portray the American colonies as victims of 
great injustice. Few studies have ever been done on the opinions of the British towards what they 
called the Great Rebellion. What needs to be asked are things like: Were the British people 
supportive, against, or indifferent to the prospective of America's becoming independent? Were 
the British soldiers and commanders optimistic about the war? How did the British government 
officials perceive the war? What were the opinions of the British commoners, especially as 
expressed in newspapers? How were feelings at the beginning of the war contrasted with the 
middle and then towards the end? 
13 Ibid., 226-227 
14 
"Department of Military Science - Battle of Lexington and Concord." Last modified October 2, 2006, 
<http://www. wpi.edu/academ ics!Depts/M i ISci/Resources/lexcon. htm I> 
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The War from the Perspective of British Military Leaders 
Shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, even some military officials believed the 
colonists were being treated harshly. A group of militant colonists had destroyed thousands of 
dollars worth of British tea in protest to the tea tax, an act called the Boston Tea Party. In 
response, Parliament passed the Coercive Acts which closed Boston Harbor and held Bostonians 
responsible for repaying the tea. 15 General Thomas Gage, top military official in American 
colonies, recommended that Parliament suspend the Coercive Acts to help mediation. King 
George III called the idea "the most absurd that can be suggested."16 The colonies must be 
punished according to the in King. The Coercive Acts were passed as punishment for the Boston 
Tea Party, and the punishment must be carried out. As early as 1774, General Thomas Gage 
doubted the ability to crush the rebellion quickly. He wrote to Lord Barrington, "If you think 
then thousand men sufficient, send twenty, if one mill ion is thought enough, give two; you will 
save both blood and treasure in the end." 17 Adjutant General Edward Harvey, the most senior 
officer in the British Army, similarly advised, "to conquer it [America] by our land forces is as 
wild an idea as ever contraverted [sic] common sense." 18 Gage also admitted the number of 
Loyalists assumed in the colonies was wearing tlun already. He wrote to William Legge, Earl of 
Dartmouth and stepbrother to the Prime Minister Lord Fredrick North, in May, 1775, "From 
what can be learned it is not found that one Province is in better situation than another, the 
People called Friends of Government are few in all and the opposite Party numerous, active, and 
15 Fisher, 112-116 
16 Solomon Lutnick, The American Revolution and the British Press (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1967), 90 
17 Ibid., The American Revolution and the British Press (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1967), 80 
18 Michael Pearson, Those Damned Rebels; the American Revolution as Seen through British Eyes (New York: 
Putnam, 1972), I 13 
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violent." 19 The American forces had the advantage of knowing the land better and felt they were 
fighting for a just cause. If Britain was to keep America, she would need to take advantage of her 
strong naval powers. 
The Battle of Bunker Hill followed these letters in June, 1775. General Gage knew he 
needed to fortify the hill north of Boston because if the rebels fortified it first, they could 
bombardment the town. Yet, before Gage could get to the hill, the farmers of the town worked 
through the night to barricade the hill despite being fire on by the British. The only way of 
getting through the barricade was through a very narrow peninsula. Instead of attacking at the 
neck of the peninsula, which would have put British troops between two rebel forces, he attacked 
in the front, assuming the rebels would quickly scatter at the slightest offense.20 Instead, the 
rebels waited until the British were within thirty yards to begin firing. They focused on attacking 
the officers. Not a single subordinate officer under General Howe would make it out unharmed. 
The British pushed on to retake the hill but at great cost. 21 Britain would win the battle but at the 
price of almost half it men, losing 1,054 of their 2,250 including 92 officers. General Sir Henry 
Clinton wrote in his journal, "The disaffected colonies army, which though badly armed, as ill 
appointed, and without discipline or subordination, was it must be confessed respectable for its 
numbers and the enthusiasm by which they were actuated."22 One of General Gage's officers 
claimed the poor performance of the British was unforgivable in, "Such ill conduct at the onset 
argues a gross ignorance of the most common and obvious rules of the profession and gives us 
for the future anxious forebodings. This madness or ignorance, nothing can excuse ... Our 
19 lra D. Gurber. The Howe Brothers and the American Revolution. (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 
1972), 22. 
2° Fisher, 250-25 1 
21 lbid., 254-255 
22 Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion; Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of His Campaigns, I 775- I 782 (New 
Haven : Yale UP, 1954), 19 
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conductor as much murdered them as if he had cut their throats himself on Boston Common. "23 
Colonel James Abercrombie, an officer involved in the battle, concluded that "a few of such 
Victories would Ruin the Army."24 
Doubts were already filling the minds of British military leaders as to whether America 
could be regained. General Sir Guy Carleton, the commander of British forces in Canada, had 
doubts as early as November, 1775, saying, " I think our fate doubtful, to say nothing worse."25 
The British military could no longer deny they were in a long, bloody war. The pleas for more 
enforcements were finally heard, and twenty-thousand regulars were promised to America by the 
Spring of 1776, but that number would not be fully met. 26 After the skirmish at Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, where the Americans would retake the lost land from Bunker Hill, General Lord 
Hugh Percy wrote to General Edward Harvey, "You may depend upon it that as the rebels have 
now had time to prepare, they are determined to go through with it, nor will the insurrection here 
turnout so despicable as it is perhaps imagined at home. For my part, I never believed, I confess, 
that they would have attacked the King's troops or have had the perseverance I found in them 
yesterday.'m This problem was furthered complicated by low number of troops and high amount 
of coastline to protect. By the summer of 1776, Chief Commander William Howe was in control 
of 12,810 men, but they were in charge of protecting over three-thousand miles of coastline with 
only seventy-three ships. Howe would have to use those supplies carefully by fighting 
offensively, which entailed destroying American shipyards, warehouses, and vessels.28 
23 George F. Scheer and Hugh F. Rankin, Rebels and Redcoats: the American Revolution through the Eyes ofThose 
Who Fought and Lived ft. (New York: Da Capo, 1957), 63 
24 Gurber. 25 
25 Pearson, 132 
26 Gurber 26 
27 Scheer: 43-44 
28 Gurber, 81 
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There was also great disagreement between the military leaders in America. General 
Howe was the Chief Commander, but General Germain and General Clinton did not agree with 
many of his decisions. Howe and Germain agreed to start the war in New York and quickly crush 
the Continental Army. Their motives were quite different, though. Howe hoped to bring the 
Continentals to negotiable terms while Germain simply wished to force the colonies to accept the 
Supremacy of Parliament. Nonetheless, these two men had great respect for one another. 
Germain wrote to Howe " I cannot take my leave of your Lordship without expressing my utter 
amazement at the decisive and masterly strokes for carrying such extensive plans into immediate 
Execution.''29 Clinton, on the other hand, thought Howe was making mistake after mistake in 
executing the war. In August 1776, Clinton wrote, "Lord Cornwallis was now immediately sent 
forward to take post at Flatbush. Thjs was a measure I did not altogether approve, as I knew it 
would bring on skirmishing to our disadvantage, which happened as I expected the next day ... 
for by this means the rebels were acquiring courage, confidence, and service."30 After this battle, 
Clinton advised General Howe to let him follow American General George Washlngton into 
New Jersey because a great number of Washington's men had been kjlled or injured in battle, 
fallen ill from exposure, or had simply deserted. Howe denied the request, much to Clinton's 
dismay.31 Clinton believed "had our troops followed them close up, they must have thrown down 
their arms and surrendered; or had our ships attacked the batteries, whlch we have been in 
constant Expectation of being ordered to do, not a man could have escaped from Long Island. "32 
Next, Clinton would recommend attacking the Congress in Phlladelphla, yet this too was denied. 
According to Clinton, either of these choices '·in all probability would have deranged all their 
29 Ibid., 84-85 
3
° Clinton, 40-41 
3 1 Ibid., 55-56 
32 Gurber, 114 
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affairs." Both of Clinton's requests vvould be denied despite pleas that ·'if some extraordinary 
reverse did not happen soon, there was good ground to hope the disaffected colonies ... would be 
compelled to give up the contest, and that this campaign would consequently be the last.''33 
Howe began to give up on the idea of reconciliation but agreed with Clinton the war 
would end soon after the summer of 1776. He admitted to Germain "as things now are, the whole 
seems to depend upon Militai) and Naval operations. The ensuing campaign may possibly be 
decisive.''34 This hope was shared by several of the British generals. General James Grant did 
''not look for another campaign'' after winning New York. General Lord Percy wrote to General 
Germain "this Business is pretty much near over" in early September, 1776. Even Lord 
Cornwallis wrote hopefully to his wife "in a short time their [Continental] Army will disperse 
and the war will be over.''35 All these experienced generals would soon learn the American 
rebellion had only begun. 
General Howe wanted to move his forces to Philadelphia in early 1777, but Clinton 
warned, "it was highly probable the instant the fleet was decidedly gone to sea, Mr. Washington 
would move with everything we could collect either against General Burgoyne or me and crush 
the one or the other, as neither would be very capable of withstanding such superior force." 
Again, Clinton's worries were ignored by his superior. 36 Clinton in fact had a \ery good sense of 
his enemy. Burgoyne was marching from Ticonderoga to meet with Howe ' s troops on the 
lludson River. He had written Clinton that communication with Canada could not be kept safely, 
and he was going to move towards the southern arm) . 37 Burgoyne would divide his men to send 
a I ,500 man unit on a scouting mission to gather information on the location of the American 
11 Clinton, 55-56 
14 Gurber, I 00 
H Ibid., 115 
'16 Clinton, 62 
17 lbid., 72 
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forces . They encountered a unit of American forces led by General Horatio Gates. The 
Americans found out about the divided move and attacked the now 5,300 man British Army "vith 
an American force t"' ice that size. Burgoyne quickly v. rote to Clinton for assistance from Ne"' 
York City. Expecting quick aid, Burgoyne wrote to hi s forces to hold out until aid was received. 
After two weeks without aid, the British troops were short on supplies with winter weather soon 
approaching. Ten days later, Burgoyne felt compelled to surrender.38 General Burgo) ne wrote in 
1777 after the loss at Saratoga, "the great bulk of the country is undoubtedly with the Congress, 
in principle and in zeal; and their measures are executed with a secrecy and dispatch that are not 
to be equaled. Wherever the King's forces point, militia to the amount of three or four thousand 
assemble in twenty-four hours.''39 
After the loss at Saratoga, Clinton would try to resign his post. I Ie wrote in his journal, 
"The campaign on the side ofNew York being thus, after so promising an opening, in a manner 
fruitlessly closed ... I renewed my solicitations to leave to return home, as I saw that m) 
continuance in America was not likely to contribute to the service of my army or the 
advancement of my own honor." Instead, I lowe would be allowed to retire, and Clinton would 
be named Chief Commander of the Army in America. lie wrote about the promotion, "The great 
change which public affairs had undergone, in Europe as well as America, within the last 6 
months had so clouded every prospect of a successful issue to the unfortunate contest we were 
engaged in that no officer who had the least anxious regard for his professional fame would court 
a charge so hopeless as this now appeared likely to be." 4° Clinton would again attempt to resign 
in the summer of 1778, stating that the war was impracticaL but the King would refuse his 
31 Lancaster, 220-225 
39 Scheer, 266 
•o Clinton, 83-85 
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requcst.41 That faJI his mood was no better as he wrote, "Besides, the force I was now at the head 
of. . . was totally inadequate to any material object. . . on the contrary, the rebels were everyday 
getting strong in numbers, confidence, and discipline and occasionally supported by ... French 
and Spanish fleet and army.'.42 
Clinton would again try to resign in mid-1779 stating, " In short, without money, without 
provisions, ships of war, or troops sufficient to accomplish the services which seemed to be 
expected of me, or even the smallest intelligence from Europe for 3 months past, my situation 
was certainly not to be envied.'.43 London was still ever hopeful in the fight to keep America. 
Secretary of State Lord George Germain wrote to Clinton in August, 1779, " I am sanguine 
enough to flatter myself with the hope he [General Cornwallis] will find means to effect the 
reduction Charleston, and that the province will be speedily restored to the king's obedience.'.44 
On the contrary, Cornwallis would lose his fight in the South. He wrote in shame to Clinton in 
August 1780, " I clearly saw the loss of the whole province except Charleston, and of all Georgia 
except Savannah, as immediate consequences, besides forfeiting all pretensions to future 
confidence from our friends in this part of America."45 Germain was in much better spirits than 
CornwaJlis though when he wrote again, "When the season admits of the general ' s sending up a 
body of troops into Vermont, the inhabitants will declare for the King which, with the reduction 
of the Southern provinces must give the death wound to the Rebellion , notwithstanding any 
assistance the French may be able to give."46 It would be this last note that would prove Germain 
wrong. 
41 Ibid., 99 
42 Ibid, I 06-107 
43 Ibid., 129 
44 Ibid .. , 4I5 
45 Ibid .. , 453 
46 Pearson, 3 71 
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Secretary Germain knew the war had to end. He wrote to General Clinton in January 
1781 , "our enemies are increased and the states of Holland are to be numbered amongst them. 
Every exertion must be made to bring the American war to a conclusion ... the circumstances of 
this country cannot support a protracted war.'.47 With the war at a stalemate at this point, Clinton 
was looking to make his final blow to the lengthy rebellion. He had sent out spies to track the 
motions of the American forces. Rebel forces had took position at Chatham in New Jersey and 
"seemed to threaten Staten Island."48 Clinton wrote "It seemed to have been therefore 
unanimously agreed that the French troops should immediately join Mr. Washington on the 
North River" in New York.49 Clinton kept his naval ships at New York to guard this important 
British stronghold. Three days later he received a message from a trusted spy in early August 
1781 that read "The Chesapeake is the object- all in motion." 
Clinton realized all too late he had been fooled. The true target was General Cornwallis in 
Yorktown, Virginia. In order to keep communications on the sea with Howe in New York, 
Cornwallis reversed and retreated to the coast of Yorktown. Instead of attacking New York, a 
small American unit would fight Howe to keep him from aiding Cornwallis while the main fleet 
of the French Navy and Franco-American troops headed for the Chesapeake to engage 
Cornwallis.50 Nonetheless, Cornwallis wrote optimistically to Clinton in September 1781, "I 
have no doubt if relief arrives in any reasonable time, York and Gloucester will both be in 
possession of His Majesty's troops." Relief would not be able to reach him, though. Clinton 
knew he would not be able to get aid to Cornwallis before the rebels with French aid had 
destroyed the fort. Clinton wrote to London saying " the tide of fortune with respect to the British 
47 Ibid., 370 
48 Ibid., 379 
49 Clinton., 305 
50 Lancaster, 331-333 
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interests in America was now very evidently beginning to tum against us."51 Clinton wrote 
Cornwallis, "I am doing everything in my power to relieve you by a direct move .. .I shall persist 
in my idea of a direct move even to the middle of November, should it be Your Lordship's 
opinion that you can hold out so long. But, if when I hear from you, you tell me that you 
cannot. . .I will immediately make an attempt on Philadelphia by land." 52 Cornwallis wrote in 
October, " I do not think any diversion would be of use to us ... with such works on 
disadvantageous ground, against so powerful an attack, we cannot hope to make a long 
resistance . . . we continue to lose men very fast."53 Cornwallis would have to write Clinton in only 
a few days, '·I have the mortification to inform Your Excellency that I have been forced to give 
up the posts of York and Gloucester and to surrender the troops under my command by 
capitulation, on the 19th instant, as prisoners of war to the combined forces of America and 
France."54 Clinton would again ask to resign his post, and this time his wishes were granted. 
Germain wrote him in early 1782, " I have the pleasure to inform you that I lis Majesty has been 
graciously pleased to comply with your request. And I am to signify to you His Majesty's 
pleasure that you embark for England the first convenient opportunity."55 The loss of Yorktown 
would be the last real battle of the American Revolution, although a fmal peace treaty would not 
be signed for two years to come. Nonetheless, the highest military officials in the war admitted 
Yorktown had been the final blow. Britain had lost America. 
Sl Clinton., 376 
sz Ibid., 577-78 
SJ Ibid., 580-58 1 
S4 Ibid., 583 
ss Ibid., 595 
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The War from the Perspective of British Political Leaders 
The history between Great Britain and her colonies in North America was very rocky in 
the years leading up to the American Rebellion. From 1756-1763, they had fought alongside one 
another against the French in the Seven Years' War, but after this war relations between the two 
peoples became strained. Some colonists began to call for literal representation in British 
Parliament, not just the virtual representation through spokespersons. Some wanted to send 
actual colonists as members of Parliament to guarantee the needs of the colonists were met. 
Many British believed this was not necessary. Parliament member Thomas Whatley said 
Parliament "virtually" represented colonists the same as it did for all women and most men who 
had no direct input towards the selection of Parliamentary members. He wrote, "all British 
subjects are really in the same [condition]; none are actually, all are virtually represented in 
Parliament; for every member of Parliament sits in the House, not as Representative of his own 
constituents, but as one of that august Assembly by which all the Commons of Great Britain are 
represented. " 56 
Others sympathized with America's call for actual representation. Even the Irish, who 
were viewed as well beneath their British brethren, received representation in their own 
Parliament in Dublin. There was also precedent for such a case for giving representation to a 
people. In the 1500s, the people of Chester demanded and then received representation in 
Parliament under Henry VIII, but those who sympathized with the Americans, the liberal Whigs, 
did not have a large enough majority to grant the request. 57 Adam Smith, the famous Scottish 
author of the Wealth of Nations, argued that the colonies should be taxed but also receive literal 
56 Eliga H Gould, The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution 
~Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 2000), 119 
7 John Chester Miller, Origins of the American Revolution (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943), 22 1 
14 
representation in Parliament. 58 King George wrote to Lord North that if he gave into the 
colonists' demands for representation it would seem "so like the Mother Country being more 
afraid ofthe continuance of the dispute than the colonies and I cannot think it likely to make 
them reasonable; I do not want to drive them to despair but to submission."59 The King and his 
ministry members decided it was not time to give representation the colonies because it would 
make it look as though the mother country was giving in to her colonies, and the pride of English 
leaders could not allow that. 
After the long and costly war with France, Britain needed to raise revenue to help defend 
her newly won lands. In 1765, Parliament passed the Stamp Act which imposed a tax on almost 
all written material and goods, from newspapers to playing cards. Colonists were infuriated by 
the new high taxes. Britons, on the other hand, believed it only fair that the American colonists 
should bare some of the burden of supporting the mother country. The war was fought to protect 
English settlers from the hated French. Was not the war fought on behalf of the colonists? Is it 
not reasonable they should therefore help pay for their own protection? Questions like these 
caused some to be offended by the colonies' hostility to the taxes. Soame Jenyns, a member of 
the Board of Trade, wrote, "can there be a more proper time to force [the colonies] to maintain 
an army at their expense, than when that army is necessary for their own protection, and we are 
utterly unable to support it?'-6° The Marquis of Carmarthen took it a step further. He viewed the 
colonists as little more than workers for Britain. I Ie wrote, "we sent them to those colonies to 
labour for us ... For what purpose were they suffered to go to that country, unless the profit of 
58 Miller, 223 
59 Peter Whiteley, Lord North: the Prime Minister Who Lost America. (London: Hambledon, 1996), 147 
60 Gould, 116 
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their labour should return to their masters here?''61 New taxes would be placed on the colonies 
for the next ten years. 
The greatest resistance to the taxes would come in 1773 with what became known as the 
Boston Tea Party. A group of Boston colonists led by Samuel Adams dumped 342 chests of tea 
into the Boston Harbor in resistance to the new Tea Tax. A Cabinet meeting was soon held in 
London where it was agreed "in consequence of the present disorders in America, effectual steps 
be taken to secure the dependence of the colonies on the mother country.'.62 Charles Van, a 
member of Parliament, said in response to the Boston Tea Party, "I am of opinion, you will never 
meet with that proper obedience to the laws of this country until you have destroyed that nests of 
locusts" in Boston. Former Governor of Massachusetts Thomas Hutchinson assured the King and 
Parliament that with strict legislation against America there would soon be "speedy 
submission.'.63 As early as 1768, Secretary of War Lord Barrington had known Boston was the 
center point of American rebellion. I le wrote to Sir William Draper: 
The present commotions at Boston are such as we see almost everyday in our own 
country: in both there are always men who prefer their own interests to the obedience 
which every good subject owes to the laws, and factitious people who avail themselves of 
every clamour which arises . .. For a time the laws are without efficacy, unless supported 
by a proper degree of legal force; when such a force appears at Boston, I am persuaded 
the magistrates will be easily enabled to do their duty and wholesome example will 
secure future obedience to the laws in all parts of America."64 
Lord Fredrick North, the Prime Minister of Britain, agreed when he said "the truth is that 
too great leniency of this country [Britain] increased their [colonists' ] pride and encouraged them 
to rebel."65 The Coercive Acts were passed in response to the Tea Party. Lord North said in 
61 Miller, 206 
62 Whitely, 138 
63 Christopher Hibbert, Redcoats and Rebels The American Revolution Through British Eyes (Boston : W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2002), 24 
64 Gould, 121 
6s Jeremy Black, ''War With America." George III: America's Last King (New Haven: Yale UP, 2006), 230 
t RILEY-HICKINL.BOTHAM LltiRJ 
()JM'~1TA IW'TIST IHMRSIT' 
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response to relations with America, "however necessary and agreeable a reconciliation with 
America might be, as no terms had been offered by America, England would not submit first. ',<>6 
North refused to think about compromising with the colonies until they fully and formally 
acknowledged the supremacy of Parliament. Others, like the Liberal Whig Edmund Burke, 
opposed the Coercive Acts because by closing Boston Harbor and shutting down Boston's 
Assembly, England was contradicting the very freedom it preached.67 While some would 
sympathize with the colonists, most would agree such behavior must be punished. Since no 
formal recognition was offered, war was now the only real answer. 
Edmund Burke was the most famous person to resist war with America from the 
beginning. He believed fighting with the colonies to keep them part of the country was 
counterproductive. He argued that by breaking the people and destroying the land, war would 
only further alienate the colonists from British interests. He also greatly agreed with their desire 
for freedom and liberty which he called "the only advantage worth living for" and people 
become "suspicious, restive, and untractable [sic] whenever they see the least attempt to v.rrest 
from them by force." He summed up his opinion in March, 1775, before Parliament when he 
said: 
But I confess considering force not as an odious, but a feeble instrument for preserving a 
people so numerous, so active, so growing, so spirited as this, in a profitable and 
subordinate connection with us. First, Sir, permit me to observe that the use of force 
alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment but it does not remove the necessi7s 
of subduing again; and a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be conquered." 8 
Burke was not fully counting America already lost, but he knew war was not the answer. He 
believed to keep the American colonies of England they must make it in the colonies' best 
interest to do so. Even if America was momentarily conquered, she would most surely rebel 
66 Whiteley, 145 
67 Burke, Selected Writings, 192 
68 Edmund Burke, Burke's Speech on Conciliation with America (New York: Macmillan, 1920), 23-25 
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again. He also argued fighting a war over taxes was meaningless. According to Burke, taxes are 
meant to bring in revenue to a country, but a war will cost money, much more so than the taxes 
which are being fought over. He believed it to be much more practical to again lower taxes than 
risk losing millions more in a costly war.69 Despite his logical arguments and spirited speeches, 
Burke was in a small minority, especially during the early years of the war. England would try to 
regain her colonies by force. 
Could the great British army be defeated by a group of untrained rebels? This question 
received a wide range of responses in the years before and during the American Rebellion. Lord 
Charles Lee wrote to Edmund Burke in December, 1774, " if I have any judgment the people of 
New England at this day, more calculated to form irresistible conquering armies, than any people 
on the face of the globe. "70 Others denied the resistance in America would ever tum to true war. 
Lord Sandwich said to the House of Lords in 1775, "They [Americans] are undisciplined 
cowardly men .. . believe me, my lords, the very sound of a cannon would carry them off ... as 
fast as their feet could carry them."71 A similar opinion was held by House of Commons member 
Richard Rigsby who asserted, "The Americans will not fight. They will never oppose General 
Gage with force of arms. "72 These men, and many like them, never dreamed this group of rebels, 
who they believed were a very small minority of the population, would ever truly fight. Within 
two weeks, both Sandwich and Rigsby were proved very wrong with the battles of Lexington 
and Concord. Not only would the colonists fight, but they would also win against the British 
regulars. The unruly mob would defeat the great British Army. Lord Percy commented on the 
change of events. He somewhat jeered at previous comments in Parliament when he said after 
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Lexington and Concord, "Whoever looks upon them as an irregular mob will be much mistaken. 
They have men amongst them who know very well what they are about. .. nor are several of the 
men void of a spirit of enthusiasm."73 King George, who would ever be optimistic about the war, 
said after the loss, " I therefore hope you will not see in this a stronger light than it deserves."74 
Others were already starting to doubt the ability of England to conquer America. One Parliament 
member said if Britain did lose the war she would " revert to her primitive insignificancy in the 
map ofthe world," possibly even be overtaken by France or Spain.75 Edmund spoke to this when 
he warned it was better to concede greatly to their brethren in the colonies than face conceding to 
a foreign offense and the longer England waited to compromise with America, the higher the 
likelihood France would intervene on the side of Amcrica.76 
War had come. There was no denying it after the battles of Lexington and Concord. 
Britons had mixed feelings towards the new war. King George III said to Parliament in 
November, 1776, the colonists who had once enjoyed "the Blessings of law and Liberty" had 
"fatally and desperately exchanged for the calamites of war and the Tyranny of their chiefs."77 
The Battle of Bunker Hill soon followed Lexington and Concord. Britain would claim a 
technical victory because the American forces would fall back, but suffered the greater losses. 
King George would still not be alarmed. He told Parliament, "1 am clear as to one point that we 
must persist and not be dismayed by any difficulties that may arise on either side of the 
Atlantick."78 After Bunker Hill, King George issued a Proclamation of Rebellion against the 
colonies, which was essentially a more formal declaration of war. House of Commons member 
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Charles James Fox, a vocal opponent of Lord North's government, wrote "I cannot consent to 
the bloody consequences of so silly a contest about so silly an object, conducted in the silliest 
manner that history ... has ever furnished on instance of, and from which we are likely to derive 
nothing but poverty, misery, disgrace, and defeat and ruin."79 Edmund Burke agreed in his 
"Address to the lUng" which read: 
We were always steadily averse to this Civil war, not because we thought it impossible 
that it should be attended with victory, but because we were fully persuaded that in such a 
contest, victory would only vary the mode of our ruin ... WE cannot, therefore, agree to 
unite in new severities against the brethren of our blood for their asserting an 
independency to which we know, in our conscience, they have been necessitated by the 
conduct of those very persons who now make use of that arguments to provoke us to a 
continence and repetition of the acts which in a regular series have led to this !foeat 
misfortune ... Sir, we abhor the idea of making a conquest of our countrymen." 0 
The war would turn in favor of Britain momentarily, especially in Canada. After the 
British victory at Ticonderoga in June, 1777, King George ran into his chambers yelling, " I have 
beat them, I have beat all the Americans!"81 Little did he know, within just a few months, Britain 
would face a major setback at Saratoga. Lord North was more reali stic when he said , "My idea 
of American affairs is that if our success is as great as the most sanguine politician wishes or 
believes the best use we can make of it is to get out of the dispute as soon as possible."82 Both 
men, nonetheless, believed the war was reaching its end. In a most ironic way, days before the 
news of the British loss at Saratoga reached Europe, King George told Lord North he never 
believed the American forces could muster as many as ten-thousand regular troops and a few 
thousand militia. Almost foreshadowing the news of Saratoga, Fox said ''the idea of conquering 
America was absurd. "83 
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When word reached London of General John Burgoyne' s loss at Saratoga, Lord North 
immediately resigned, but King George refused to accept it, seeing it premature and foolish.84 
North wrote a very strongly worded letter to the king advising, "the pride of your political 
friends and yourself stand in the way of everything that would be efTective or indeed, have the 
appearance of proposition li~ely to be accepted in any part of America." The Duke of Grafton, 
who \"vas a member of the Opposition to the ministry in Parliament, summed up public opinion 
upon hearing of the defeat at Saratoga: "the amazement of the whole nation was equaled only by 
the consternation they felt. ''85 Lord North tried to reach a peace agreement with America after 
Saratoga. He met v.ith Benjamin Fran~lin and two other ambassadors. The king was not 
enthusiastic about the meeting. He saw it as futile and worried it would anger his friends in 
Parliament to seem so weak. 86 The Prime Minister ofTered to end certain punitive acts such as 
the Tea Act and Coercive Act and promised no more revenue taxes on America. lie also 
proposed a peace commission to meet with the American Continental Congress to possibly 
suspend all legislation concerning the colonies since 1763. Most Parliament members agreed that 
while this offer might have prevented the war, it was not enough to end it thi s late into it.87 Also, 
scandal killed the proposition when negotiators were caught trying to bribe members of the 
Continental Congress. 88 After the success of Saratoga, the Americans would accept nothing but 
complete recognition as an independent country. 
Lord North was growing weary of the war. lie would attempt to resign several times 
during the war, but King George always refused to accept them. Lord North told a senior civil 
servant, William Eden, his desire was "to get rid of thi s damned war" but could neither convince 
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the King to accept he could not take America by force or allow North to retire and wash his 
hands of it all.89 It would be another four years until North was allowed to retire and five years 
until King George would finally admit America could not be taken by force. In March, 1778, the 
Prime Minister would again plead v. ith the King to end the war and allow him to retire when he 
"vrote, "peace with America, and a change in the Ministry are the only steps which can save the 
country. "90 Even the King showed the first signs of real concern once France formaJly entered 
the war in early 1778. lie \-VTOte to Lord North in March of the "faithless and insolent conduct of 
France" to enter this purely British war.91 He later admitted in November, with the growing 
naval war, " the misfortune is we have more to defend than we have ships ready to employ."92 
Within a few months, though, King George had returned to his insistence that the war continue. 
lie '-VTOte North "Before 1 will ever hear of any man's readiness to come into office, I "ill expect 
to see it signed under his hand that he is resolved to keep the Empire entire and that no troops 
shall be withdrawn from thence [North America] , nor independence ever a1lowed."93 
Faith in Britain's ability to win this war was wearing. Parliamentary candidate for 
Oxford, William Jones, \-Vfote to his benefactress Lady Georgiana Spencer, "I fairly confess, that 
I rejoice, as an Englishman, in the success of America, that I detest the war from its beginnings 
to the hour, and that I think the form of government. .. which the American states have 
established, manly, sensible, rational , and as perfectly adapted to them ... "94 King George 
referred to this a most '"dishonourable peace" with America many called for.95 Despite many 
cries by advisors and members of Parliament, the ever proud George III would not hear a word 
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of compromise with the rebels. llis pride and power were much too great. lie was determined to 
win this war, maintain his colonies, and prove his position as a great leader in the world . He 
rarely wavered in his belief throughout the war that Britain was fighting a true and rightful \'var 
and that she would soon crush the rebellious Americans and reassert her power in the world. 
Perhaps this is why even after the last battle of the war was fought King George would not admit 
defeat for another two years. 
Even after the disaster of Yorktown, King George gave a speech to Parliament saying the 
'"diluted [sic] subjects in America" would soon return to "that happy and prosperous condition 
which they had formally derived from, a due obedience to the laws." He asked for a "prosecution 
of this great and important contest." Lord Germain reluctantly called for a continued and 
vigorous attack to subdue America. Lord North promptly got up from his seat in parliament to 
move away from Germain as a testament to his utter disagreement.96 The worried Prime Minister 
wrote a letter to King George saying, "peace with America seems necessary, even if it can be 
obtained on no better terms than some Federal Alliance, or perhaps even in a less eligible mode. 
This is my opinion, which I have the honour of submitting before Your Majest)-."97 King George 
wrote back to Lord North saying when '·men arc a little recovered of the shock felt b) the bad 
news they will find the necessity of carrying on the war, though the mode of it may require 
alterations."98 I Ie would refuse "the getting of peace at the expense of a Separation from 
America'' well into 1782 99, well after no major battles were fought and a treaty was in most 
minds, only a matter of time. It was not until 1785 the King would agree to meet with a 
representative from America and give a formal recognition of independence. He admitted to John 
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Adams upon meeting, "I will be frank ~ith you. I was the last to consent to the separation; but 
the separation having been made, I have always said ... that I would be the first to meet the 
friendship of the United States as an independent powcr."100 
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T he War from T he Perspective of British Newspapers and Pamphlets 
Should the press be subjecti\ e? hould it simply state the facts as they appear\\ ith no 
opinions of the ·writers and editors? Does the press reflect public opinion, or does it mold public 
opinion? These are questions raised about the power and influence of the press. With the creation 
of the Guttenberg's printing press in 1440, the world would forever change into a more literate 
people where information could spread more easily and more quickly. Most would agree the 
press reflect the opinions of both its writers and its constituents. People often buy a specific 
newspaper due to their own political alliances. They will read a paper whose editors seem to be 
of the same opinion tO\\<ards issues. This is especiall) true during political tunnoil and war. It is 
during these trying times the political opinions of newspapers and their readers come through the 
most. 
This political alignment shined brightest during the American Rebellion. Newspapers 
were the public source of information on politics, world affairs. the economy. and especially war. 
Even the vast public who could either not read or could not afford to purchase a newspaper could 
gather in places like coffee shops to hear the papers read and then enjoy discussion with other 
tO\\'llSpeople. Liverpool merchant Charles Goore \\TOte in a letter in January of 1775 "The coffee 
houses are now crowded waiting to hear the resolves of Parliament relative to the American 
affairs." 101 The British newspapers depicted the outcome of the American Rebellion "'ith their 
political association well known to their public. A reader of the Salisbury Journal wrote, " I 
believe there is not a person in this kingdom but is more or less interested in the present struggle 
between us and our American Colonists. and not many so totally divested of all concern for the 
events, as to take no side in it; but everyone seems to ha\e attached himselfto one of the 
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other."102 The Opposition press was critical almost from the beginning, and the Tory press 
remained optimistic nearly throughout the war. After the embarrassing British loss at Saratoga, 
more papers which had generally considered themselves moderate and did not align with the 
Ministry or the Opposition began writing more consistently and more completely in opposition 
to the American Revolution. 
The Opposition newspapers were all of the same opinion regarding the Ministry who 
served King George and Parliament: corrupt and inept. Many of them were Whigs who had 
fought for rights in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. 103 The Opposition press included papers 
such as: The Evening Post, Public Ledger and Middlesex. By 1776, the more moderate 
Gazetteer, StJames's Chronicle and Morning Chronicle also joined the Opposition.104 The 
Gazetteer switched to the Opposition because it feared the loss commerce from war with 
America, which was full ofraw materials. It also distrusted of the use of Hanoverian mercenaries 
and hated the Ministry filled with the King's "favourites" who were resorting to bribes and 
corruption to guarantee a Parliament with no opposition to the King. 105 The St. James's 
Chronicle wrote March 15, 1775 a question and answer article ridiculing Parliament: 
Q- What is the Royal Prerogative? 
A- As much as it can get. 
Q- Wherein lies the privilege of Parliament? 
A- In the people's pockets 
Q- How does a Modem Member of Parliament represent his constituents? 
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A- As doing as they did- selling himself 106 
The Opposition saw Parliament as nothing more than a group of greedy men who had completely 
and fully forgotten their true purpose in representing the people. Also, the Opposition held 
complete disdain for Lord North. The St. James 's Chronicle wrote in February, 1775, comparing 
him to a "School-Boy" who "cons his lesson [when] he cannot get it by Heart."107 He was seen 
as a stubborn fool who followed the will of the King and other ministry leaders. Anti-Ministry 
opinions like this are what grouped the Opposition press together. 
In the earliest onsets of the war, even the Opposition press was critical of the American 
colonists. They believed the Ministry would use its corruptive nature to further tarnish the image 
of the English mainland. The St. James 's Chronicle wrote March 9, 1775, that by sending 
negotiators to America "with the fullest powers of Bribery ... " it would put down the dignity of 
Parliament "at the Feet of seven and twenty Assemblymen in New York, for the single favor of 
ceasing to oppose."108 The American Congress was seen as a small group of rebellious elites that 
did not represent the wishes of the masses and should not be treated as a legal body worthy of 
negotiations. Many Britons believed the American Congress was a group of "factious 
demagogues, whom if you could catch and hang, all would be quiet." The Pubic Ledger even 
went so far as to say if people like John Adams and John Hancock could be brought to England 
for trial the whole rebellion would cease, and there was no real need to look into the demands of 
the colonists because they were being exaggerated by such rebellious leaders. 109 Lloyd 's Evening 
Post wrote April 3, 1775, against quenching the "indignant flame of British honour" by making 
any kind of concessions to the rebels. Later, in December that year, they asked readers "Could 
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the Americans still possibly have one Advocate amongst a rational people?" It concluded that " it 
was now necessary that the British Supremacy should shine forth its full lustre." 
Some papers were much more insightful of the mindset in America, and tried to break the 
image of Congress portrayed in other papers. The London Evening Post warned in March 1774, 
"Some People have suggested an incoherent Idea, that the People of Boston were a partial 
Faction. Be it known to the Legislature of England, that is a Falsity- that all the Provinces are 
united in their Opinion and are determined to uphold the cause of America." 110 The St. James 's 
Chronicle echoed this in November 1774, "Government is determined never to relinquish her 
Right to taxation; and America is determined not to submit to Taxation; the consequence is, that 
a war between the mother country and the colonies will commence." Jacob M. Price wrote a well 
publicized pamphlet in 1774, "The Imperial Economy" in which he estimated the £2.649 million 
in exports to American and the £1.442 million in imports was far less than the estimated £14 
million per year the war would cost. The public was shocked at the high cost difference which 
proved to be remarkably accurate. 111 The Gazetteer equally was looking at the big picture. It 
wrote in July, 1775, that concessions were needed to save business interests in the colonies 
which was much more important than a "punctilio of honour" and wrote if war began, to expect 
"French and Spanish treachery". An annoyed reader calling himself"A True Briton" wrote the 
Gazetteer after that publication and said any Briton willing to negotiate with the rebels "must lay 
down their arms, humbly beg the royal pardon, and submit themselves as in duty bound to the 
laws, and ordinances of the British legislature ... and should answer it with his head on Tower 
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Hill." 112 No concessions would be made, though, and war was on the horizon for the mother 
country and her discontented colonies. 
Most pro-government papers spoke of American colonists with little to no respect. The 
Gazetleer and New Daily Advertiser wrote in November, 1765, Americans have created a 
"crabbed race not very unlike their half-brothers the Indians for unsocial principles, and an 
unrelenting cruelty." The papers continued their comparison by saying that giving Americans 
representation in parliament would be like letting a Mohawk sit beside an Englishman. 11 3 The 
Morning Post called Americans " the scum or off scouring of all nations," and The Daily 
Advertiser called them "a hotchpotch medley of foreign, enthusiastic madmen." 114 One 
Englishman wrote "I have always considered the colonies as the great farms ofthe public, and 
the colonists as our tenants, the American colonists as little more than a set of slaves at work for 
us, in distant Plantations one Degree only above the Negroes that we carry to them." 11 5 Joshua 
Steele wrote a paper, "An Account of a Late Conference on the Occurrences in America", in 
1766 where he wrote giving the colonies representation "would go so much against the stomachs 
of some of our countrymen, that it could never be got down." 11 6 Because Americans were 
viewed many levels beneath that of a "true" Englishman, public support stayed very low for 
giving the colonists representation in Parliament. 
Loyal or Tory papers remained optimistic towards the war almost throughout its entire 
course. A few examples include the General Evening Post and London Chronicle. They were 
often filled with articles by Ministry leaders and Tory members of Parliament who were known 
for their support of the Ministry. The London Chronicle wrote February 20, 1766, almost a 
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decade before the full scale rebellion, it is "neither fair nor honest" for colonists to refuse to pay 
taxes when "that army which defends them against savages" is paid for by taxation. 1 17 Loyalists 
wrote since the colonies were being protected by their mother country, they should pay taxes 
willingly as any good citizen of Britain would. On this point, most Englishmen could agree. An 
article from 1769 reads "If Americans ... would judge with candour, they would readily 
acknowledge that their brethren on this side of the Atlantic lie under much more pressing 
burdens than themselves."1 18 The businessmen of England all paid taxes their American brethren 
did not. The lack of taxation was one of the great enticements in moving to the colonies and 
establishing business there. When colonists began rebelling against taxation, the Tory papers 
condemned them immediately. They saw no reason for the Americans to rebel against something 
the English had been doing for centuries. 
Rumors of a growing American militia reached the British press by late 1774 through 
letters of colonists and government officials. The Opposition press focused on the emerging 
Colonial Army. The Bristol Journal wrote in March, "We are assured that almost every county 
in Virginia, Maryland ... and Delaware have chosen their officers, and are learning the military 
exercises with the greatest diligence." The St. James's Chronicle wrote in April a pro-Congress 
militia of 15,000 in Virginia alone had been raised , with Maryland and Pennsylvania following 
suit. 119 Worries over French and Spanish aid were constantly on the minds of Britons. The Derby 
Mercury estimated France and Spain's standing armies at 150,000 and 120,000, while Britain 
had only a 40,000 man army. 120 The difference was staggering to readers. The Derby Mercury 
tried to reassure its readers in September, 1776, when it promised some 10,000 loyalists had 
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joined British forces under General Howe, but these estimates would prove to be greatly 
exaggerated. 121 
By the summer of 1775, over 30,000 troops were headed to America, which left little 
room to doubt that all out war was coming. 122 While some Opposition publications may have 
resisted negotiations with America initially, they soon switched to full resistance to the war. The 
Whigs that filled these papers could sympathize with America because they saw many 
similarities between the colonists' demands and their own demands during the Glorious 
Revolution.123 The Evening Post in April, 1775, referred to war with America as "unnatural, 
unconstitutional, unnecessary, unjust, dangerous, hazardous, and unprofitable." 124 The Middlesex 
Journal in both April and June 1775 predicted an American military win and independence from 
Britain because as the paper said, it was full of"absurdity and madness" to fight such a great war 
across the Atlantic with people fighting for their freedom. 125 This article was assuming the deep 
rooted motivation and homeland advantage of the Americans would insure a long, bloody fight 
they were destined to win. The Evening Post also agreed the Americans had reason to rebel. 
They relied on their political affiliation to guide their motivation. They attacked the "cowardly 
and treacherous" Ministry for passing cruel and inhuman laws on the colonies, and now that war 
was in sight, was putting British lives at risk. 126 Throughout the war, Opposition newspapers 
would continue to attack the king's ministers as corrupt, ignorant, and completely disconnected 
with the will of the British people and the colonists. 
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The British military had no motivation in fighting this war, according to the Opposition 
press. The Chesler Chronicle reported in September, 1775, that the enlisted sailors looked 
"spiritless and averse the service." The Evening Post, Morning Post, and St. James 's Chronicle 
all reported in September and November of 1775 great numbers of officers in England were 
attempting to resign to avoid being sent to America. Commanders in America were already 
asking for permission to be relieved of duty. The St. James 's Chronicle later wrote April, 1776, 
"no less than nine general officers of superior rank, refused the command of the troops in 
America before General Howe accepted it."127 Whether it was hatred of leaving their homeland 
of England for a treacherous sea ride across the Atlantic to a foreign place to fight a deadly war 
or their secret support of the rebels themselves, it is obvious the British military suffered greatly 
from low morale, and the Opposition newspapers used this to fuel their anti-Ministry, anti-war 
rhetoric. Due to insufficient numbers of British troops, a shortage of two to three thousand by 
some estimates, and poor morale throughout the country, the British looked to Hanoverian 
mercenaries to fill their numbers. This in fact further lowered morale because most British 
citizens opposed using foreigners to fight a purely English war. 128 The English public had little 
respect for the outsiders interfering with what they saw as a civil war. 
The Opposition continued to focus on their anti-Ministry stances after the rebellion 
began. The London Evening Post on May 4, 1774, compared General Gage's new appointment 
as military governor of Massachusetts to a Roman dictator and maintained that such action 
would forever injure relations with the colonies. 129 The Prime Minister, Lord Frederick North, 
received little to no respect from the Opposition press. The same can be said for George 
Germain, Secretary of State for the American Department. The Evening Post wrote in March, 
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1776, that after "each blunder" in America, the two leaders did nothing but quarrel with one 
another, passing the blame between one another. The paper wrote a limerick, "When two such 
lads of mettle, cannot their business settle, Good people where's the wonder, if England's rent 
asunder." This behavior between two leading Ministers further drew the distinct lines between 
the Opposition and the Tory newspapers. With each ministrial problem, the Opposition 
continued to use it as fuel to why America was lost to Britain. The St. James 's Chronicle wrote 
sarcastically of the bickering among Ministers in August, 1776, when it said "no wonder the 
present Ministry are so successful at home and abroad when we consider what wonderful 
Harmony reigns among the Ministers and those they employ."130 
The one thing the Tory and Opposition press agreed that without trade with England, the 
colonies would starve financially like "dutiful children" without a mother. 131 Most people agreed 
if trade were stopped with America and the British Navy could successfully blockaded the ports 
in America, the colonies would be forced to surrender in a few months due to lack of supplies. 
The General Evening Post wrote at the beginning of 1776 that Britain had "with the great 
indulgence and patience of a parent, soothed, flattered , and even courted them to a reconciliation 
[holding] out the olive branch when she ought, perhaps, to have stretched for the rod of 
correction" to restore "the just authority ofthis kingdom." 132 Others continued to question 
America's abi lity to support herself. The Morning Post wrote in August, 1776, that America had 
removed its "duty and allegiance which in honour and necessity they owe" to England. 133 James 
Macpherson, a famous writer of the time, published his pamphlet The Rights ofGreat Britain 
Asserted Against the Claims of America in October, 1776. In it he defended the supremacy of 
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Parliament, especially its right to tax the colonies through virtual representation. He attacked the 
"pretended arguments justifying rebellion." He called the Declaration of Independence "folly" 
and full of " ignorance" that did not reflect the majority of American opinion. He said the country 
had been "misled" by "rabble." The Morning Post wrote in March, 1777, a counter argument 
when it said all the "villainous designs" of the American Congress in the press had "at length 
sealed the lips of every republican on this side of the water." 134 Macpherson also believed the 
colonies did not have the ability to finance a war and doubted any European state would come to 
their aid. 135 The press was full of opinions of people who saw the colonies as children deserving 
a good whipping from a parent. The Morning Post, though, wrote even without England's 
manufactured goods, America would survive because it was such a large land mass with diverse 
landscapes which were "capable of producing everything so desirable in life." 136 Others doubted 
America's ability to finance a war or defeat the grand British forces. History would prove 
Macpherson and the others very wrong. America would eventually receive help from two of the 
strongest European powers, France and Spain. 
The greatest shock of the war would come to England in the winter of 1777 with news of 
British defeat at Saratoga. The Public Ledger, which had always opposed the war, called King 
George III "a very lying prophet" for promising victory in "the next campaign" following 
Saratoga. The paper added how ridiculous this was when they said "fifty thousand veteran 
troops, have not in three years, been able to obtain secure possessions of fifty miles of land in 
America."137 The Edinburgh Advertiser described Lord Germain 's speech to the House of 
Commons telling them of the surrender by Burgoyne at Saratoga with "His Lordship's speech 
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struck the house with astonishment and such a gloom appeared on the countenance of every 
member, as might be supposed to have been settled on the countenance of every Roman senator, 
when the defeat at Cannae was announced in the Senate."138 Most of the Opposition press 
including The Gazetteer, Packet, and Annual Register all concluded in the winter following 
Saratoga that continuing the war was "national suicide."139 The Gazetteer talked of how General 
Howe in New York would fall just as Burgoyne. The Public Advertiser predicted the rebel victor 
of Saratoga, Horatio Gates, would soon take over New York and expected the news at "any 
hour." The London Packet, Ipswich Journal, and other papers speculated that Philadelphia would 
soon fall to the rebels. 140 
The Morning Post blamed the Canadian loss on the poor leadership of London and to 
General Howe specifically. It asserted that if he had moved some of his troops from Philadelphia 
to Canada in support of General Burgoyne at Saratoga, Britain would have won. 141 Burgoyne 
shared in the blame of General Howe for the loss at Saratoga. He believed Howe "might well 
have spared" up to three-thousand men to aid at Saratoga, and if he had "the entire reduction of 
all the northern rebellious colonies would have ensued." Unknown to either the press or 
Burgoyne, Secretary Germain had supported Howe staying in Philadelphia, so the ultimate blame 
lay with the leadership in London. 142 The Morning Post praised British courage, leadership and 
magnanimity at Saratoga. It claimed the defeat was because of the great numerical advantage in 
troops by America. Ironically, this same paper had previously reported that the troop size of 
America was extremely small and could be crushed quickly and completely. The Gazetteer had 
perhaps the most violent response. It wrote the Ministers who had formulated the Canadian plan 
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should justify his plans, and if he could not do so properly "his head should answer for his 
temerity." The General Evening Post was unable to come up with an adequate reason why 
Britain would lose such an important battle, so they began printing the idea that American 
soldiers were using buckshot in their muskets which would injure more than one man at a time. 
The Morning Chronicle adopted the same idea and said American soldiers dipped their bullets in 
poison before shooting to ensure killing any man hit. 143 There was little to no basis for these 
accusations, but the public was so astounded by the defeat at Saratoga that the press tried to 
come up with anything to lessen the blow. 
While General Howe was looked upon with complete disdain, the commander at 
Saratoga, General Burgoyne, was one of the few leaders who had near hero status even after his 
loss. After Saratoga, the Loyal press emphasized he had sustained two wounds before giving in 
to the out numbered force of over 32,000. 144 Howe was soon replaced with Sir Henry Clinton. 
Clinton would receive the same praise as Burgoyne from the Tory papers, yet nothing but 
ridicule from the Opposition. The Chronicle was so sure of Clinton's victory in Charleston, 
South Carolina, that it reported the victory six weeks in advance. 145 This was not necessarily a 
good decision, because while Clinton would lay siege of Charleston, a previous attempt to take 
the city had failed miserably in 1776. Nonetheless, the Loyal press continued its praise of 
Clinton. Following his retreat from Philadelphia to New York, even the moderate Morning Post 
called it a "brilliant maneuver" to bring " immortal honour" but also "the most happy presage of 
future victories." The paper was attempting to take a defeat and spin it into a military tactic to 
keep the public in support of the new commander. The Evening Post, on the other hand, wrote in 
complete disgust that "Sir Henry Clinton is to do wonders at the fmancial expense of all 
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Englishmen" and onJy give ' 'the whale" of debt another " tub" to soak in. 146 It was after defeats 
like this the prejudices of each paper came through strongest. The Opposition would take a 
defeat as yet another piece of evidence of the poor leadership of the corrupt Ministry. The Loyal 
papers would take such a defeat and try to either point out good aspects of it or tum it into 
something in which it most probably was not. 
Morale for a war often can be swayed by the charisma of its leaders, both in the military 
and the government. British newspapers showed almost no respect for its own military leaders, 
but ironically had great respect for the enemy general, George Washington. On hearing of 
Washington's position as military commander of the colonies, Gentleman 's Magazine assured 
readers Washington was no Oliver Cromwell and was a firm believer in constitutional processes. 
Washington promised to resign as soon as hostilities ended. He was a man of"unimpeachable" 
character. Their expectations were both correct. Even though Washington would serve as the 
first President of the soon to be independent United States of America, he was no Oliver 
Cromwell in that he had attempted to refuse the post but felt the desires of his fellow Americans 
were more important than his personal desire to retire. He would serve his two, four-year, terms 
as President and then step aside in a time when he could perhaps have become a new monarch or 
dictator. Scot 's Magazine also pictured Washington as a man of sense and integrity, polite with 
dignity, and modesty in manners. Even after his defeat on Long Island, the Annual Register in 
England wrote in 1776 that he executed the war with great ability and performed the part of "no 
mean commander." They were equally kind in their description of his victories. After taking over 
Boston, Annual Register wrote he marched "with drums beating, colours flying, and in all 
triumph of victory" while being received by the town as a deliverer. 147 
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After the loss at Saratoga, the press realized Britain was suffering economica11y from the 
loss of raw materials her colonies had provided. In January, 1778, the Westminster Journal 
described that while financial trouble in America was meant to show Britain had weakened the 
enemy, it did little to a1leviate the poor situation of England. Trade had slowed to nearly nothing, 
while threats of higher taxes from the growing national debt combined with the downward spiral 
of the stock market put England in as bad if not worse of a situation as her enemy.148 By this 
time, Spain and France both had joined the American cause against Britain. This further hurt 
trade and increased the national debt to astronomical figures since Britain was now at war with 
her own colonies plus two of the strongest countries in Europe. The press was bleak regarding 
the economy. The Courant wrote in 1778 if the war continued for five more years, Britain would 
most certainly be on the brink of national bankruptcy. 149 The crown was financing an expensive, 
far reaching war, and the economy was in a state of recession. Taxes were at an all time high. 
Trade was almost non-existent. The stock market fell almost daily. All the press reported the 
falling stocks. The Reading Mercury wrote January 5, 1778 after talk of a French War, "within 
the last three weeks only, they have fallen almost 5 per cent." A few days later, Westminster 
Journal wrote, "stocks fell again on Wednesday upwards of two per cent." After a French War 
was fully realized, threat of French invasion of Malabar Coast in India caused East India 
Company securities to fall four per cent. By the beginning of 1778, the Westminster Journal 
wrote inflation was so high and the economy so bad, men were joining the military as their only 
option for survival. Others, according to the Packet in June 1778, were migrating to America. 
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Merchants who were unable to trade their goods in Britain immigrated to America where they 
thought their fortunes would be higher. 150 
By 1778, Britons were tired of war. The Chronicle wrote on January 31, 1778, if America 
could not be won in nearly three years of fighting, it could not be done. Its readers agreed, and 
one wrote in that an accord binding British and American interest together as independent and 
sovereign states was the answer. 151 In February 1778, the Annual Register reported Lord North 
was planning a bill to the House of Commons to repeal most of the Coercive Acts, suspend 
Parliament's right to tax the colonies, and create commissioners to negotiate with the American 
Congress "as if it were a legal body." This bill was met with "a dull melancholy silence" with 
looks of"astonishment, dejection, and fear overclouded the whole assembly." The legislation 
passed the House, but due to the British evacuation of Philadelphia, Congress believed it had the 
upper hand and rejected any negotiations less than recognition of independence and removal of 
all British forces. 152 Israel Mauduit wrote a pamphlet named A Hand Bill Advocating American 
Independence, inspired by the English Ministry. He defended North's bill and said with French 
support, America could not be won. He said despite loss of the colonies, free trade capitalism 
would cause America to still be under English political and economic influence. He said the 
longer the war lasted, the more American would begin to favor trade and influence from the 
French, a thought that would disgust and worry any good Englishman. He believed this alone 
was reason to try to end the war and begin friendly relations with the new country. 153 
Adam Smith, the famous author of the Wealth of Nations, admitted in 1778 that even if 
England won the war, it should not keep America as a colony but set up a federation because 
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nothing else would keep "to the prosperity, to the splendor, and to the duration of the [British] 
empire."154 The Evening Post wrote in October 1779 "after having lost the best part of four 
regiments, the British had gained no object, but lost time. The mode of carrying on a war, at 
three thousand miles distance, must in the end ruin the richest and most populous country in the 
world." 155 A pamphlet written in 1780 summed it up in saying, "Let us not any longer amuse 
ourselves with the thoughts of the conquest of America. She has now acquired experience; she is 
assisted by powerful nations, and the people look no longer towards Britain."156 For most of the 
Opposition and moderate newspapers, the war was over. They knew the war could not be won. 
The war would nonetheless continue until 1783, two years after another embarrassing loss, 
Yorktown, would deny anyone the possibility the mother country could regain control of her 
child like colonies. The Earl of Strafford, Horace Walpole wrote, "Will such disgraces have no 
consequences? Is not America lost to us?"157 Britain would formally sign the peace treaty giving 
freedom to America on September 3, 1783. 
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Conclusion 
In general, the opinions in Britain fighting to regain her rebellious colonies received high 
praise in the beginning. Most of the military officials were confident if the early skirmishes could 
be won, the rebels would cease. While the British did win the early battles, they were narrowly 
won at great cost. The momentum of the rebel forces was stronger than anticipated. The political 
leaders in England were initially very optimistic about the war. Edmund Burke was the only 
strong opponent of the war in the early days. The Opposition press quickly decided it would 
write against war with America, but the Tory press maintained its insistence on regaining the 
colonies at all cost. 
As the war dragged on, certain leaders such, as General Clinton, realized the longer the 
war lasted, the less likely it was that Britain could ever regain her colonies. The colonies had 
become much too united in their insistence on independence. Likewise, government officials in 
England were losing hope, especially after the Battle of Saratoga. Many Parliamentary and 
Ministry leaders, even Prime Minister Lord North and Secretary of State Lord Germain, would 
advise King George to make peace with America. His pride would not have it. Immediately after 
the news of Saratoga hit the press, the Opposition papers called continuing the war "suicide." 
The Tory press created various excuses for the loss, including numerical advantage of the 
Americans, the maneuvers used by the British and baseless lies about the tactics used by the 
Americans. 
After the loss at Yorktown, in 1781 under the Franco-American alliance, Britain would 
not fight another meaningful skirmish. Formal peace would not come until September 3, 1783. 
Even so, the stubborn King George III would refuse to meet with American representatives until 
1785. Nonetheless, America was an independent state as of 1783 and the "Great Experiment" 
under a democratic nation would begin. 
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